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CORRECTIONS T O APPELLEE'S STATEMENT O F TEE CASE
A N D COURSE O F PROCEEDINGS
,

l

'

paragraph

pLat'•••*.:

(2) on

• -.

t

e Bnei

ill A p p e l l e e

At pre-trial, Commissioner Sandra Peuler awarded
wife $2,000 per month as temporary alimony. [R 2325]
The document which Plaint.i ft' is <:.i.tintj is not the pre-trial

Recommenda .

commissioner Peuler but rather is the Temporary Order

signed by Commissioner Arnett on December 6, 1991, wherein he awarded
the Defendant $2,000
2.

At

the

5.

t-. .,:.c!..

conference

held

November

5, 1 9 9 2 ,

Commissioner Peuler proposed that permanent alimony be set at $2,000 p e r
month.
3.

i P Q "1 ]
At paragraph (4) on page 5 of Response Brief of Appellee, t h e

A p p e l l e e states:
(4 I Only t h e alimony issue remained for the bench trial of
January 7, 1 9 9 3 . [TR 470-473]
Howi«\te r , t h»:'.'

i s s i;i e

(, > I

111<••'

v .-i 1 n<

\ > I 1: he personal. property

d i s t r i b u t i o n remained as well as the Issue of attorney's fees.

[TR 4 7 4,

542]
4.

At paragraph 7.B

on. page ] 0 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee s t a t e s :
The

parties

never

Fruitland, Utah.
T'

' la.int.. i.Jt c i t e s

liveu

^- <

Lhi.i

home

at

[TR 533]

U I M 1 o 1 .1 ov

home:
1

-

\.

i

. regarding that

Mr. Peterson:

Was that your marital residence during the latter
years of your marriage?

Ila Ernstsen: Well, just the last few months of our marriage—
well, before he filed for divorce because—
It is clear from Defendant's testimony that the parties did
live together in the home at Fruit land, Utah, during the last few months
of the marriage.
5.

At

paragraph

7.D.

on page

10 of

Response

Brief

of

Appellee, the Appellee states:
7.D. Wife would return to the Fruitland cabin only in
the Summer when weather permitted. [TR 536]
This

statement

is

simply

incorrect.

The

Defendant

testified as follows:
Mr. Peterson:

Now, Mrs. Ernstsen, Ila, I just want to cover a
couple of these with you very quickly.
The
condominium fee. You currently are incurring and
you will continue to incur that through the rest of
this winter until you are able to move back up to
Fruitland Height; is that correct?

Ila Ernstsen:

Yes.

Mr. Peterson:

That will be eliminated as a monthly expense when
April or May gets here and you can get back in and
reopen your home and make your permanent residence
back in your home; is that correct.

Ila Ernstsen:

Yes.

[TR 536]

It is clear from the Defendant's testimony

that she

intended Fruitland to be her permanent residence.
6.

At paragraph 9 on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee, the

Appellee states the following:
9.

Wife's "expert" witness is a CPA who happens to be her
nephew. [TR 406] Wife's counsel and Peterson have been
best friends for over twenty years (since 1971) and have
traveled the world together. [Id.]
Even their wives are
often confused for each other.
[id.]
Peterson has
appeared as an expert witness for wife's counsel's client
[Id.]

2

However, Randall Petersen also testified as follows:
Craig Peterson:

You have appeared in cases both in opposition
to the party that 1 am representing as well as
the party that I am represent I ng; is that
correct?
•jt 's correct.

Craig Peterson:

Yon have been qualified in cases as an expert
person in more than a dozen cases before this
Court; is that correct?

Randa I ] Pe ter sen:

Yes.

Craig Peterson:

And what you are deal ing with here today in
presenting to the Court, would your position
as the nephew of Ila Ernstsen or your position
as
my
friend,
personal
friend
and
acquaintance, influence your testimony?

Randall Petersen:
Craig Peterson:

Have you attempted in the past when you have
appeared as a. witness in, as an expert, in
behalf of clients that I represent or as an
expert in behalf of clients which are in
opposition to me, have you, in fact, tried to
present your testimony in the same basis
regardless of who you are appearing in behalf
of?

Randall Petersen:

I believe there are farl h 1 lustily In., | "T" R
4 07-40(8]

' paragraph 9.A. on page 11 of Hospon.se Brief nf AppelLee,
tne Appe

•Peterson reviewed solely (1) the parties' 1983-1991
individual income tax returns and (2) only the income
from, but not Vaughn Cox' actual report of Ernstsen
Plumbing's income for the fiscal years 1988 to 1991• [TR
408, 432, 447]

The statement, "'only the income front but, not Vaughn Cox' actual
report of Ernstsen Plumbing' i\ income I
is mis] eadi ng.
Vaughn Cox

lie TiscaJ years 1**88 to 19**1"

Randall Petersen testified that he used a section of

report that discloses the corporation's income for the

fiscal yea n s ] 9 8 8 , .1 9 8 9 , ] 9 9 0 aric I ] 9 91
3

8.

At paragraph 9.B. on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee states:
9.B. ...Peterson gave no authoritative basis for his opinion
the District Court clearly accepted Morris' opinion that
cash expenditure and depreciation equals out. [TR 429]
This statement goes to argument rather than a statement of the
case and course of proceedings; and, consequently, should be stricken
from this portion of the Brief.

In addition, the transcript at page 429

is interrogation of Randall Petersen by Judge Young in support of his
personal theories.

Mr. Morris had not even testified before the Court

yet; the Court could not have "accepted Morris' opinion" at that point.
The statement that the District Court clearly accepted Morris' opinion
that cash expenditure and depreciation equals out "[TR 429]" is not
evidenced by the citation given by Appellee nor anywhere else in the
evidence, pleadings or the Court's ruling.
9.

At paragraph 9.D. on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee states:
9.D. Peterson thinks most of the trucks were paid off by 1991. [TR
427] In fact husband's Exhibit 5 shows (a) 223 monthly truck
installments for a total of approximately $93,000 remaining
[husband's exhibit 5] AEE's Addendum No. 4
That

statement

is

false.

Randall

Petersen

testified

as

follows:
Clark Ward:

So
then
over
time
doesn't
cash
depreciation equal themselves out?

and

Randall Petersen:

I guess it depends on how you depreciate the
asset.
He paid for some of those over six
months. I think most of the cars, until 1991,
had been paid for. [TR 427]

In addition, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 simply outlines the
following payments from Zions Bank:

4

1991
1992
1993

$445.95
465.85
487.31

Ford L-150
Isuzu
Isuzu

4 3 payments
46 payments
50 payments

These are nothing more than installment payments over time and
they total $65,034.50, not $93,000 as represented by Defendant.
10.

At

paragraph

9.E.

on page

11 of

Response

Brief

of

Appellee, the Appellee makes the following statement:
9.E. ...Peterson's bald statement was unsupported by a
scintilla of evidence or authoritative basis for
his "opinion."
This statement should be stricken from this portion of the
Brief as it is argument rather than a statement of the case in the
course

of

proceedings.

In

any

event, Plaintiff

has

ignored

the

testimony of Randall Petersen whereby foundation was laid to qualify him
as an expert:
Craig Peterson:

Mr. Petersen, you are a Certified Public
Accountant licensed to practice in the State
of Utah, is that correct?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

Craig Peterson:

And how long have you been so licensed?

Randall Petersen:

Approximately 20 years.

Craig Peterson:

And in that regard,
accounting firm?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

Craig Peterson:

You have been qualified in cases as an expert
person in more than a few dozen cases before
this Court, is that correct?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

11.

you

have

your

own

[TR 405, 407]

At paragraph 9.G. on page 13 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee states:
9.G. Husband is replacing his salary with truck lease
payments.
[R 420]
Petersen's statement was totally
uncorroborated showing husband simultaneously increased
his lease payments and decreased his salary.
To the

contrary, the evidence is that the lease payments
remained essentially the same throughout the period in
question.
In reviewing the citation given out of context by Appellee, Randall
Petersen testified that if the corporation does not pay the Defendant
the lease payment then there is more cash available in the corporation.
The

citation

by

Appellee

actually

occurred,

once

again,

during

examination by Judge Young:
Judge Young:

Well, I guess—let me ask it differently. I
don't see that the location of the ownership,
whether it is individual or corporate, makes
that much difference in what I'm asking you,
because if you take a net marital estate and
you divide the net marital estate but one of
the parties is receiving income from the
operation of one of the assets, all right?
Let's just take one party has a $100,000. C D .
and the other party has a $100,000 house. All
Right? Now, why do you take the money earned
off the C D . and call it income and leave the
house idle and don't call it anything?

Randall Petersen:

Because the C D . is, in fact, earning income.

Judge Young:

There's no question about that. But if the
party wished to sell the house and make the
house a $100,000 C D . , it would be earning
income and it would be offset.

Randall Petersen:

Well, but in this case there is no reason to
pay the lease payments out of the corporation
and, in fact, I mean, he's simply replacing
his wages with lease payments.
I mean, you
got to add those two together because that's
total compensation to him.
I mean, that's
cash
money
that's
coming
out
of
the
corporation and being expensed.

Judge Young:

I recognize that.

Randall Petersen:

And when you expense that at the corporate
level, that has been down valuing the value of
the corporation due to those lease payments.

Judge Young:

Well, that's right. So if it's down valuing
the corporation then you may have to re-adjust
the value of the corporation.

6

Randall Petersen:

No, that's already been done. He has used the
net incomes after those expenses.
I guess,
still, my best example is take the lease
payments and throw 'em out of there and give
him compensation, and it is the same thing,
the assets are held by the corporation and
you're right, it doesn't matter where they are
held. What you are talking about is the cash
flow from the corporation to him in either the
form of wages or lease payments. And if you
don't pay him the lease payments, then there
is more cash available and I increase this add
back for corporate income.

Judge Young:

Well, I don't quite—it is not entirely clear
to me how you would be considering those
assets differently, because if I've taken my
example, and in your case the corporation is
the $100,000 C D . and the cabin is the
$100,000 idle asset in this particular case,
now if one party from their asset that is
being awarded to them independently
is
receiving the working asset and the other is
receiving the idle asset, why should you take
the generated income off the working asset and
call it personal income rather than from
employment and effort you don't take anything
off the idle asset?

Randall Petersen:

Well, the idle asset isn't producing income.

Judge Young:

Well, I know that, but it can be changed.

Randall Petersen:

Well, we are talking about where the person
lives. I mean, there is no availability.

Judge Young:

I'm not talking about where the person lives
I'm talking about a recreational property and
I 'm talking about something that could be sold
and changed into a working asset. It seems to
me that you're mixing the—and this is where
I'd like you to clarify it for me—but it
seems to me that you're mixing the assets.
And when you divide assets you ought to take
the assets out and the earnings off of the
assets.
If one party keeps a C D . that's
going to give 'em income, another party keeps
a cabin that's going to give 'em no income,
then you don't take the party getting the
C D . , throw that into their gross income
because, for the purpose of paying alimony,
because that's what they've chosen to do with
their working asset. So what I'm saying—

7

Randall Petersen:

I see what you're saying. Then I think what
you've got to do is, because the corporation
is the working asset, it is the thing that is
producing the income, and if you are going to
do that, maybe your best approach would be to
assume, okay, let's take the equity on the
real property asset and let's assume some kind
of return.

Judge Young:

Right.

Randall Petersen:

A three or four percent return currently is
about all you can get out of it if you can
convert it to cash, whatever that equity is.

Judge Young:

You could do it that way or you could say,
let's ignore both—I can see if he is keeping
his earnings low and then supplementing it by
a lease payment that perhaps his earnings, in
effect, are
net
higher, the
asset
is
generating more earnings and I can see a need
to make some adjustment in that regard, but if
I take—let's just suppose this case. Suppose
we have two people, husband and wife, married,
and that they both bring into the marriage,
prior to the marriage, an asset. She brings
in a house worth $100,000, he has sold his
prior house worth $100,000 and has contact
income. Okay?

Randall Petersen:

Mm-Hmm.

Judge Young:

All right. Now, they live together in their
marriage, and let's just assume that the
contract comes into the marriage, all right?
Now, when you divide the marriage up at the
end do you say, well, okay, you keep the
house, to her, in my example, but you get
nothing because all of your contract income
came into the marriage?

Randall Petersen:

No. I think you take the value of the house
and you take the value of the contract.

Judge Young:

And you back it out.

Randall Petersen:

Whatever the outstanding value is you add them
together.

Judge Young:

After the marriage?

Randall Petersen:

No, at the time of the divorce. Because they
both had the benefit of cash flow from the
contract, right?

Exactly.

8

Judge Young:

Right.

Randall Petersen:

An as Terral and the family have had advantage
of the income from Ernstsen Plumbing. An so
you take the two assets, the house and
whatever the contract balance remaining is,
you add 'em together and divided by two. And
the income over that period of time doesn't
represent
the
return
of
the
principal
payments, it only represents the interest
portion of that.

Judge Young:

I can see that.
I don't have any problem
following that one. I could do it that way
too.

Randall Petersen:

An that's my point here.
I think that the
corporation has provided a return in terms of
cash to this family to live on and that's what
I'm trying to arrive at. What is the cash
available from the business to provide them a
living. I mean, we have looked at the asset
itself and valued it and said it's worth
$95,000, and I think that value is in the
trucks and the equipment and the good will and
the accounts receivable.
I think those are
all assets that are value. I don't think it
has anything to do with the income that was
generated by that asset for the family to live
on. I mean, it looks to me like you got to
look at it in terms of cash that was available
after they pay taxes and all the other things.
Again, he could have left his salary. Instead
of $40,000 he could have left it at $20,000
and we'd have another $20,000 of income in the
corporation.
And I think you can't ignore
that.

Judge Young:

I agree. I don't have any problem with that
but I do see a difference in, if you're
dividing equities, once you divide
the
equities you can't very well say that one
equity, which goes to him, is nevertheless
going to be eroding by the annual yield off of
that equity for the purpose of dividing—or
for the purpose of supplementing his income.
To me, that doesn't make sense.

Randall Petersen:

Well, but here we put the value that w e ' r e —
Vaughn Cox has put the value of the vehicles
into the corporation.
Now the value of the
corporation is established. If that had been
the case in all of these years that he was
taking lease payments out of there, there'd be
more income.
9

Judge Young:

I understand that.

Randall Petersen:

That's the best analogy I can make, I think.

Judge Young:

Thank you.

[TR 418-424]

The last two sentences of paragraph 9.G. should be stricken
as they are not a statement of the case and course of proceedings.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's statement that "the evidence shows that the
lease payments remain essentially the same throughout the period in
question" is not correct and is not supported by the record. [TR 486,
487]
12.

At paragraphs 9.H., 9.1. 9.J. and 9.K. of Appellee's Brief,

the citation to transcript page numbers are incorrect.
13.

At paragraph 9.L. on page 15 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee states:
9.L. Petersen acknowledged that
Fruitland
cabin will not
replacement. [TR 486]
The

citation

to the record

citation is [TR 434].

is again

unlike the trucks, the
wear
out and
require
incorrect.

The

correct

In addition, paragraph 9.L. is a misstatement of

Randall Petersen's testimony.

Randall Petersen testified as follows:

Clark Ward:

While, the trucks depreciate and the cabin
does not, first of all, right?

Randall Petersen:

Under the tax law, real property
does
depreciate. Part of the real property does
depreciate just like trucks do.

Clark Ward:

Okay.
But the cabin does not need to be
replaced when it wears out approximately every
three or four years like the trucks probably
will.

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

14.

That's right.

At paragraph 10.D, on page 15 of Response Brief of Appellee,

the Appellee misstates the Court's finding:

10

10.D.

Husband's
monthly
income
of
$2,914.34
multiplied by 52 weeks divided by 12 months
equals $1,457 per month [TR 453]

This is an inaccurate statement of the Court's finding. Judge
Young made the following finding:
Now, Mr. Ernstsen has the benefit of having his [assets] work
better than that because of his leases on the trucks that are
part of his asset, he has it working at the rate of $787.78.
The difference between the $674.44 which is being imputed to
both parties, and the $787.78 is $106.34 per month. So Mr.
Ernstsen's income is determined by the Court to reasonably be
$2,808.00 as salaried income, $106.34 as surplus equitable
earnings, for a combined total of $2,914.34 per month. That
times twelve is $34,972.08. That divided by two is $17,486.00
that should go to each. Dividing that by two, it is $1,457.00
per month. The Court determines that it would be appropriate
for Mr. Ernstsen to pay $1,451.00 per month as alimony. [TR
453]
15.

At paragraph

16. F. on page

18 of Response Brief

of

Appellee, the Appellee states:
16.F.

...No bias or prejudice was manifested at the
pre-trial conference. [R 354]

This statement should read, "If the issue of bias or prejudice
is a legitimate one, it was manifest at the pre-trial conference."

[R

354]
ARGUMENT I.
THE APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT REJECT THIS APPEAL
OUTRIGHT BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS MET THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW BY MARSHALING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND
DEMONSTRATING CLEAR ERROR.
The Appellee argues that "the Court may reject this Appeal
outright because Appellant has failed utterly to meet the standard of
review requiring Appellant to marshal all of the evidence and show clear
error."

[Response Brief of Appellee] The Appellee cites Oneida/Slic v.

Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d (Utah App. 1994) which
states:
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To successfully challenge a trial court's findings
of fact, Appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate. [Attorneys] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position.
In order to properly
discharge the [marshaling] duty..., the challenger
must present in comprehensive and fastidious order
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very finding Appellant
resists. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In Re
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989);
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987);
Commercial Union Associations v. Clayton, 863 P.2d
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite
Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).
Oneida further states:
Once Appellants have established the
pillar
supporting their adversary's position, then they
"must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and
show why those pillars fail to support the trial
court's findings.
West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co,, 818 P.2d 314. [Page 1053]
Appellants who merely present carefully selected
facts and excerpts from trial testimony in support
of their position do not properly marshal the
evidence as required to challenge the trial court's
factual findings. [Page 1051]
Marshaling the evidence first entails marshaling, or listing,
all of the evidence supporting the findings that are challenged.
Indus, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d

1282, 1286

Alta

(Utah 1993); Saunders v.

Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,
475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper, Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899900

(Utah 1989); In Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886

(Utah

1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); In Re:
Estate

of Hamilton, 869 P.2d

971, 977

(Utah App. 1994); Willev v.

Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 551 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d
540,

543

(Utah App. 1993); Robb v. Anderson, 863 P.2d

1322, 1327;

Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993);
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State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Gray, 851
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App. Cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)); King
v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Johnson
v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d

910, 912

(Utah App. 1992);

State v.

Peterson, 841 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d
467, 471 (Utah App. 1991).
In the present case, the Appellant has "listed" or "marshaled" all
of the evidence supporting the findings that are challenged.

Appellant

has "marshaled" all the evidence in the section entitled "Statement of
Facts" beginning on page 7 and concluding on page 30. The Statement of
Facts includes testimony given by Ila Ernstsen, Terral Ernstsen, Randall
Petersen (Defendant's expert) and Guy Morris (Plaintiff's expert).

In

addition, Appellant has provided the Appellate Court a copy of all
exhibits introduced at the trial in the Appendix of Appellant.
Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with the appropriate
citations to the record, the Appellant must then demonstrate that the
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision.
1992).

Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d

134, 138 (Utah App.

The Appellant has met the burden of demonstrating that the

marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision.

[See Brief of Appellant, "Argument", pages 32-43]

After

marshalling all the evidence, the Appellant has clearly demonstrated
that the Court committed error by failing to consider the historical
income of the Plaintiff by failing to consider net corporate income and
mixing the division of assets with the post-marital duty of support and
maintenance.

Accordingly, the Appellant's duty to marshal the evidence
13

has been properly discharged and the Appellate Court must consider the
merits of the challenges to the findings.
ARGUMENT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN LAW BY AWARDING THE DEFENDANT
$l f 450 PER MONTH AS ALIMONY.
A.

The Appellants Appeal should not be dismissed because the

District Court denied Defendant's Motion for New Trial.
The

Appellee

argues

that

Appellant's

Appeal

should

be

dismissed because the District Court denied Defendant's Motion for New
Trial.

Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that:

(a)

Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all of any of the parties on all
or any part of the issues for any of the following
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new
trial and an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment: (7) error in law.

A Rule 59 Motion for New Trial is a post-trial remedy that is
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The fact that the

District Court rejected the Defendant's Motion for New Trial may not be
construed as "bolstering" Appellee's position that the Appeal should be
dismissed.

Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates the

fact that a party may file an Appeal.

Pursuant to Hume v. Small Claims

Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979); Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797
P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990), a timely Motion under Rule 59 terminates the
running of the time for Appeal of a Judgment and the time for Appeal
does not begin to run again until the Order granting or denying such
Motion is entered.
denied

Defendant's

Consequently, the fact that the District Court
Motion

for New Trial

Defendant's Appeal should be dismissed.
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is not

a basis

on which

B.

The District Court failed to consider Defendant's needs.
The Appellee argues that the District Court fairly considered

wife's needs.

The Appellee states:

The Court merely observed, with only nine payments remaining
on the cabin, she could reduce the $700 plus payment to a
nominal amount. The Court also properly observed the vehicle
could be financed to reduce its monthly payment.
[Response
Brief of Appellee, page 26]
However, the Court made the following specific findings:
25. The Court recognizes that the Defendant has a $721 per
month debt owing to Zions Bank for a garage; a $455 auto
payment, and a $300 per month tax liability on alimony.
26.

The Court finds that based on the alimony award it is
reasonable that the Defendant refinance the two major
expenses of her current monthly expenses, the $721
mortgage payment and the $455 auto payment over a 15-year
period.

27.

The Court finds that based on the alimony award, the
Defendant has an obligation to engage in creative
financial planning. [See Appendix of Appellant]
The Judge found that a woman of 61, having no abilities, being

unemployed, and no income history, would be able to refinance her
liabilities over 15 years.

Even after stating that he recognized the

wife's needs, the Judge completely ignored her needs.

The Judge made

specific findings for the restructuring of the Defendant's liabilities,
which are not possible given the Defendant's health and age, income and
ability, and the fact that no financial institution will finance an
automobile for 15 years.
C.

The District Court failed to consider Defendant's ability to

produce sufficient income for herself.
The Appellee argues that the District Court fairly
wife's ability to produce income for herself.
the Court considered:
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considered

The Appellee argues that

Evidence supporting the finding that the parties never lived
in the Fruitlandf Utah, cabin together, that she lived for the
past year in her sister's condominium, that she cannot travel
to Fruitland in winter months, and that she plans to sell the
cabin for her retirement." [Response Brief of Appellee, page
27]
However, the Defendant testified that she was not currently
employed and that she has not worked for a wage in about 40 years.
531]

[TR

The Defendant also testified that she is currently a severe

diabetic and is required to take insulin on a daily basis and it would
be very difficult for her to hold down a job because of her diabetic
condition and the fact that she is 61 years of age.

[TR 532]

The Appellee argues that the District Court correctly treated
her

"recreational

property"

husband's truck leases.

as

income producing

that would

offset

However, the Defendant testified that the home

at Fruitland was the marital residence because the Plaintiff sold the
family home in Salt Lake City and purchased the Fruitland residence and
that she is going to live in the Fruitland home on a permanent basis.
[TR 533 and 534]

That testimony was unrefuted by any evidence and

testimony presented by the Plaintiff.

It is clear that the Court erred

in its application of the law in this case.
inappropriate
furniture

and

It is unreasonable and

to require the Defendant to use her automobile, her
her home to generate income to

set off

against

the

Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony.
D«

The District Court failed to consider all of Plaintiff's

income.
The Plaintiff has attached two exhibits (AEE's Addenda 10 and
11) that were not admitted into evidence at the trial.

These two

exhibits were created solely for use in the Response Brief of Appellee.
These exhibits were not part of the Court record and should be stricken.
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Nonetheless, after reviewing these two exhibits, they contain
inaccurate and misleading information which is not supported by the
record.

For example, in column

Available

Funds

1 entitled

at His Historical

"Husband's Monthly Net

Salary Minus Truck Leases," the

Plaintiff states that his pre-September 1992 net income was $501.51 per
week.
TR

The Plaintiff gives the citation of TR 32. However, in reviewing

32, there

is no testimony

given

stating that Plaintiff's pre-

September 1992 net income is $501.51 per week.

In column 2 entitled

"Husband's Monthly Net Available Funds at His Historical Salary Plus
Truck Leases," the Plaintiff states that his net salary is $2,173.25.
That figure is not supported by the record nor by Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 4.

Further, closer examination of document "AEE" discloses that it

is replete with inaccuracies.

For instance, Appellee mixes "gross" and

"net" incomes; he fails to reduce the debt accurately; and he includes
a debt that is paid off in four months.

However, the record does state

that Plaintiff's gross income per month is $5,530.60, which supports
Defendant's request for $2,750 per month in alimony.
The
distributed

Plaintiff

argues

that

the

husband's available income.

District

Court

equitably

The Plaintiff argues that

Defendant's own "expert conceded that he had reviewed no documents and
offered no testimony to rebut Morris' testimony that corporate funds
were not available to husband."

[Response Brief of Appellee, page 28,

Plaintiff fails to provide a citation to the record]
statement is incorrect.

However, this

In fact, the record reflects that Randall

Petersen testified that he reviewed the parties' tax returns for the
years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 [TR 411], and that corporate funds
should be added back to Plaintiff's income.
as follows:
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Randall Petersen testified

Craig Peterson:

Then the term, the next term, "spendable
income add back corporate net income, why have
you done that?
Where did you get those
numbers?

Randall Petersen:

The corporate income represents the net income
after tax which was part of the valuation
report.
I believe Schedule 3 shows the net
after tax corporate income for the years 1988
through 1991. And the reason I show that in
there is simply because if he chooses to make
his salary whatever he makes it and leave
income in the corporation, it seems to me that
is still income available to him.

Craig Peterson:

Let me ask you in that regard, were you the
expert in the case entitled Muir v. Muir?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

Craig Peterson:

And in fact, did you testify
district court in that case?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.

Craig Peterson:

And did you testify using exactly this same
methodology in that case?

Randall Petersen:

I think this is a basic concept.

Judge Young:

I
do not have
methodology.

Craig Peterson:

Did you testify in Muir v. Muir that corporate
profits — first of all, was Mr. Muir, as you
understand the testimony and the evidence
presented in that trial, a sole stock holder
in that case as is Mr. Ernstsen here?

Randall Petersen:

I believe he was, yes.

Craig Peterson:

In that case did you testify that Mr. Muir had
the corporation profits remaining at each
year-end which should be added to his income?

Randall Petersen:

I believe that is the case, yes.

Craig Peterson:

And did you take that same approach in that
case?

Randall Petersen:

Yes.
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any

problem

before

with

this

this

Craig Peterson:

All right. Is it your position then that the
corporate profits on average should be added
back to Mr. Ernstsen's spendable income or
cash available to him to spend?

Randall Petersen:

I believe it should, yes.

Craig Peterson:

Then in making this analysisf you did not at
any time include benefits, other benefits he
may receive from the corporation such as
automobile expense or paying professional fees
or any other thing which might come out of the
business; is that correct?

Randall Petersen:

This
corporate
deductions.

Craig Peterson:

So in addition to what you show here as
spendable income, $74,000 on average, $74,839,
you have not included the benefits which Mr.
Ernstsen gets from the company.

Randall Petersen:

No.

Craig Peterson:

For instance, his automobile payment.

Randall Petersen:

No.

Craig Peterson:

Or his auto expense.

Randall Petersen:

His income is actually the lease payment which
was made to him.

Craig Peterson:

I understand that.

Randall Petersen:

But yeah, it does not add back in personal
benefits derived by the corporation, no. [TR
412-414]

Randall

Petersen

testified

income

under

is

after

those

cross-examination

with

respect to Exhibit D-7, "Add Corporate Income," that he did not have the
financial statements but had the report of the appraiser Vaughn Cox
which included Balance Sheets and Summary Income Statements.

Randall

Peterson testified on cross-examination:
Clark Ward:

So it would be foolhardy for someone to take
any of this money, just spend it on himself
for whatever reason. He would be putting his
company and all his employees and his own
salary at risk in doing so wouldn't he?
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Randall Petersen:

Well, I suppose you can make that argument,
but if he leaves his salary low and leaves the
earnings in there, then you wouldn't.
Then
you have got his income low. I don't know how
you can ignore the fact that he leaves income
in the corporation. That's his decision. And
he could have cut his salary to $20,000 and
left $50,000 profit in there too.

Plaintiff's counsel cites Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah
App.

1992),

and

states

that

the Muir

decision

supports

husband's

position "because it holds corporate net profits should not be added to
husband's income unless it can be shown that the money stayed in the
corporation for discretionary improvements that would benefit husband
rather than to "maintain [the businesses] in a condition." [Response
Brief of Appellee]

In the Muir case, however, the Court made the

finding that the husband needed to reinvest in the business.

The

Appellate Court stated "the finding that husband would need to reinvest
in the business is problematic because the Court failed to find whether
the reinvestment constituted a "discretionary decision...to expand and
improve" or whether the reinvestment was to "maintain it in its present
condition."

[Muir quoting Jones v. Jones, 100 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1985)]

In the present case, the Court did not consider the corporate net income
in the amount of $14,385 and made no findings regarding that corporate
net income.
corporate

The Muir case states that the Court is required to consider

income as well as review the benefits received

corporation.

from the

In the present case, the Court not only failed to consider

corporate net income, but also failed to take into consideration the
personal benefits Plaintiff is receiving from the corporation.

For

example, the Defendant testified that he does not have any living
expenses as he is living with his girl friend, Michelle Howard, who is
employed

by Ernstsen Plumbing.

[TR 494]
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The Plaintiff

further

testified that he and Michelle Howard intend to get married following
the divorce from Ila Ernstsen.

[TR 510]

Plaintiff testified that his

personal automobile, auto insurance, tax and license, and his health,
accident and life insurance are paid by Ernstsen Plumbing.

[TR 505, 507

and 509]
The Plaintiff states that "wife offered no evidence to rebut
husband's testimony that his business is failing and the corporate
profits were left in the corporation to save the business."
Brief of Appellee, page 28]

[Response

The Plaintiff did testify that he depleted

all of the money in his bank account, "gone without" and borrowed $1,500
from Ernstsen Plumbing to pay wife's temporary alimony.

However, there

is no testimony given by the Plaintiff that indicates his business was
failing and the corporate profits were left in to save the business.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's expert, Guy Morris, testified that if the
corporate earnings were cash, it would be available for distribution.
[TR 526-527]
ARGUMENT III.
JUDGE YOUNG PREDICATED HIS PERSONAL HYPOTHETICAL POSITION OF
AN ADVOCATE IN SUPPORT OF HIS THEORY RATHER THAN ALLOWING THE
CASE TO BE TRIED TO HIM. CONSEQUENTLY. JUDGE YOUNG SHOULD BE
REMOVED FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE AND A NEW JUDGE
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED.
The Plaintiff argues that "the recusal issue is moot since wife's
appeal

lacks any legal or factual basis for reversal and remand."

[Response Brief of Appellee, page 30]

The Defendant has marshaled all

of the evidence in this case and has demonstrated that the findings made
by the District Court are erroneous and should be reversed and remanded.
The Plaintiff argues that "The trial was to the bench; hence, there
was no jury to prejudice and Judge Young expressed none."
Brief of Appellee, page 30]

[Response

Obviously, a jury was not involved in this

matter as it was a domestic proceeding. Plaintiff's argument that Judge
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Young did not express any prejudice is false.

Judge Young's prejudice

and bias against Defendant's position is clearly evidenced by the fact
that 60% of the examination of Randall Petersen was conducted by Judge
Young and the fact that Judge Young became so attached to his personal
position that he ascribed earning capability not only to the home but to
the Defendant's furniture and furnishings as well as to her automobile.
Appellee argues that "Wife waived all claims related to recusal by
not raising them immediately after the facts which formed the basis for
disqualification became known."

[Response Brief of Appellee, page 30]

In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites Madsen v. Prudential, 767
P.2d

538

(Utah

1988),

and

states

identical to the present case.

the Madsen

case

is

nearly

However, the Madsen case can be clearly

distinguished from the present case.
Court states

that

In the Madsen case, the Appellate

"that a party who has reasonable basis for moving to

disqualify a Judge may not delay in hope of first obtaining a favorable
ruling and then complain only if the result is unfavorable."
542]

[At page

In the Madsen case, the Plaintiffs were representatives of a

certified class of borrowers whose trust deeds with Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter "Prudential") contained language
identical to that contained in Madsen's trust deed.

In 1984, the action

was assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup. At the close of the trial, Judge
Rigtrup ruled from the bench.

However, prior to Judge Rigtrup's ruling

an exchange occurred between the Court, the attorney for Prudential and
the attorney

for the Madsens whereby

it was brought to everyone's

attention that Judge Rigtrup had been a customer of Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association. The attorneys for Prudential did not object
during the course of the exchange, and after the ruling, Judge Rigtrup
asked if either wished to take any exceptions, and Prudential's attorney
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stated only that an appeal was anticipated before any class issues would
be

addressed.

qualifications

However, no
was

voiced.

specific

objection

Thirty-nine

days

to

Judge

after

Rigtrup's

Judge

Rigtrup

announced his decision, Prudential raised its first formal Objection to
Judge Rigtrup's qualifications to hear the case by filing a Motion for
Disqualification under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In

that case, the Appellate Court ruled that the Motion was not timely.

In

the present

case, the extent of Judge Young's bias was not fully

revealed until after the trial had concluded.

The trial concluded on

January 8, 1994, and the Motion for Recusal was filed on February 12,
1994.

In the Madsen case, it is clear that the Defendant did raise the

issue of disqualification in hopes of obtaining a favorable ruling.

In

the present case, however, Judge Young's bias and prejudice was not
revealed until the trial had been concluded at which time Defendant's
counsel filed a Motion to Disqualify as soon as practicable after the
bias and prejudice was known.
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Whenever a party to an action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit
that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further than except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state facts and the reasons for the
belief that such bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed
as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or
such bias or prejudice is known...
Consequently, Defendant complied with the requirements of Rule
63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In any event, it would be

appropriate for the Appellate Court to consider the Defendant's claim of
bias pursuant to Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
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The Appellate Court addressed the issue of bias sua sponte as the issue
was not brought up in the lower Court.
ARGUMENT IV,
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's "Request for Attorney's Fees must
be

rejected

out of hand."

[Response Brief

of Appellee, page

32]

However, Defendant was awarded $4,000 in attorney's fees by the District
Court.

In a domestic case, where the trial Court has awarded attorney's

fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on the main issues, the
Court generally awards fees on Appeal. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1037
(Utah App. 1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App. 1992).
Accordingly, the Appellate Court should award the Appellant attorney's
fees on appeal and remand for determination of the amount of reasonable
fees.
CONCLUSION
Appellee's

Response

Brief

was

so

riddled

with

errors

and

misstatements that approximately one-half of the Reply Brief was devoted
to correcting these errors.
Appellee's Brief fails to refute any of the arguments presented to
the Court for review.

It is evident that the Court committed error by

failing to recognize Defendant's historical income and ignoring all of
Defendant's present income, attributing income potential to dormant
assets awarded to the Defendant, attributing income to the Defendant
which did not exist as a matter of evidence, and by demonstrating
prejudice and bias by becoming an advocate.
The Court should remand this case with instructions to the lower
Court to enter a award of alimony of $2,750 per month retroactive to the
date of the entry of the original Decree.
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Further, Judge Young should

be directed to recuse himself from further proceedings in this case and
a new Judge should be assigned.

Finally, the Court should award the

Appellant attorney's fees on Appeal and remand for determination on the
amount of reasonable fees.
DATED this <*- l day of October, 1994

[ANNA B. SAGERS
rney for Defendant/Appellant
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